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BAR BRIEFS

COMMENT
The Right to Maintain Action in Another State to Collect
or Enfore a Tax.
By BARBARA SHAFT*
*Of the School of Law, University of North Dakota.
The state of Oklahoma brought an action in the St. Louis Circuit
Court (Missouri) for the collection of an income tax obligation incurred
by defendants while they were residents of the state of Oklahoma.
The defendants filed a general demurred which the circuit court
sustained. Plaintiff then refused to plead further and judgment of
dismissal was entered. On appeal by the plaintiff, the St. Louis Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment and held that the action could be
brought by the state of Oklahoma. State of Oklahoma ex. rel. Tax
Commissioner vs. Rodgers, et al., 193 SW (2d) 919 (Mo.) (1946).
The rule has long been established both in this country and in
England that the courts of one sovereign will not enforce the revenue
laws of another. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) ss. 443, 610;,
3 Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935), ss. 610.1, 610.2. The underlying
principle supporting this rule was first announced in early English
decisions. The earliest case to lay down the rule was Boucher v. Lawson,
Cases Temp. Hardwicke 85, 95 Eng. Reprint 53 (1734), in which the
court enforced a contract to deliver gold from a foreign port, holding
that the courts of England would not enforce a statute of the foreign
state making such a contract to export gold illegal.
In the United States the rule was first adopted in the case of
Ludlow Trustees v. Van Rensellaer, 1 Johns 94 (N. Y. 1806). The
court there held that a note made in France could be sued on in the
New York courts even though the' stamp tax required by a French
statute had not been paid. James v. Catherwood, 3 Dow. & Ry. 190
(1823), a later English case on a similar note, adopted the same rule.
The only question involved in these early decisions was whether
or not a contract which evaded a foreign revenue law was enforceable
in the courts of another soverign state. The rule as applied to this type
of case has received more recent support in Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co.
v. Wenatchee Land Co., 122 Minn. 266, 142 N.W. 305, 46 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 697 (1913). There the Minnesota court held that a Washington
corporation, which had not paid its annual franchise tax, could maintain
an action in the Minnesota courts even though, under the laws of the
state of Washington, a corporation could not maintain an action unless
it had paid its franchise tax.
It will be seen that the cases to first announce the rule did not
actually determine whether or not it would be against the policy of the
sovereign to enforce a foreign revenue law. They merely decided thai
such a revenue law would not be enforced when it affected the commercial contracts of its citizens. The primary basis for the holdings
seemed to be a desire to promote commercial convenience.
Since then the rule has been expanded until the courts have almost
lost sight of the underlying basis of the early decisions. In Maryland v.
Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N. Y. S.. 173 (1911) the question of whether
or not a state could enforce -a valid tax levied by it in the courts of
another state was first passed upon. The court there refused to enforce
a personal property tax assessed by the state of Maryland. The decision
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was based on the rule as laid down by the early decisions, but in its
reasoning the court construed it more as a rule of public policy than as
a.rule of commercial convenience. Several later New York cases have
stated -the rule and applied it to other situations. The court, in State of
Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921), refused to
enforce a Colorado transfer tax on the estate of a Colorado resident who
had died in New York. In re Estate of Bliss, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N.Y.S.
185 (1923) and In re Estate of Martin, 136 Misc. 51, 240 N.Y.S. 393
(1930)* were cases in which the courts refused to the foreign states the
right to collect in the New York courts valid inheritance taxes imposed
by them.
The federal courts sitting in New York have followed
the same
principle. In New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corporation
et al., 11 F 2d 698 (1926), the court refused to require the New York
receiver of a Virginia corporation to pay a franchise tax imposed by
the state of Virginia. Another federal court sitting in New York followed
the rule in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600 (1929). The court there
stated that, "The effort to collect a tax (in New York) for a political
subdivision of Indiana is repugnant to the settled principles of private
international law, which preclude one state from acting as a collector
of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its penal or revenue
laws as such." This case was later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.
281 U. S. 18, 50 S. Ct. 175, 74 L.Ed. 673 (1930).
It is interesting to note that the only cases directly in point on this
question, prior to the instant case, arose in the courts of the state of
New York or in the federal courts within that state. Of these cases only
Mllarland v. Turner, supra,holds directly on the point. Moore v. Mitchell,
supra, and Colorado v. Harbeck, supra, both refused to enforce foreign
revenue laws, but in both there was additional reason for the court's
refusal, the courts holding that the foreign taxing district had not
jurisdiction to impose the tax in question. In New York Trust Co. v.
Island Oil & Transport Corporation,supra, the court refused to enforce
a foreign revenue law, but apparently based its conclusion on the basis
that the tax was illegally assessed.
The United States Supreme Court gave the first indication that
the rule might be relaxed in the future in the case of Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935).
The court there held that a judgment for a tax recovered in the courts
of the taxing state cannot be denied full faith and credit by another
state simply because it is for a tax. The court stated that the question
of whether or not the revenue statutes themselves should be enforced
in a foreign state remained an open question.
In jurisdictions other than New York there have been indications
that perhaps a more lenient rule will be applied. In J. A. Holshouser Co.
v. Gold Hill Cooper Mining Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650, 70 L.R.A.
183, (1905) the North Carolina court allowed the state of New
Jersey to file a claim against an insolvent corporation for an unpaid
franchise tax. Jurisdiction was taken by the court in the case of
Henry v. Sargent, 13 NH. 321, 40 Am. Dec. 146 (1843), on the ground
that the action was not an attempt to enforce a foreign revenue law, but
the opinion contained dicta to the effect that the rule that one state
will not enforce the revenue laws of another is no longer binding on that
court.
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The recent cases of Bowles v. Barde Steel Co. 164 P. 2d 692 (Ore.
1945) and Lapinski v. Copacina, 131 Conn. 134, 38 A. 2d 592 (1944),
indicate that the rule cannot be applied to federal revenue statutes. These
cases held that the rule that one sovereign will not enforce the penal
laws of another did not apply to an action to recover a penalty under
the Emergeny Price Control Act. It was indicated that the same rule
would follow as to revenue laws, since both are based on the same
principles of public policy, and no state may invoke a state public policy
to defeat a valid federal statute if the action is within the ordinary
jurisdiction of the state court.
The foundation for the principle against enforcing foreign revenue
laws was stated by Judge Learned Hand in his concurring opinion in
Moore v. Mitchell, supra, as follows: "To pass upon the provisions for
the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the
powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are entrusted to other authorities. It may commit the domestic state to a position
which would seriously embarrass its neighbors. Revenue .laws fall within
the same reasoning; they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence
as its criminal law."
On the other hand, as pointed out in 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, the
increasing uniformity of state tax laws has made the interpretation of
foreign laws less difficult. Thus, the rule is not so necessary today as it
may have been in the past, for decisions in such cases are no longer so apt
to lead to embarrassment between the states.

The case of State of Oklahoma ex rel Okla. Tax Commissioner v.
Rodgers et al, here under discussion, is the first affirmatively and
unequivocally to adopt the view that. one state should enforce the
revenue laws of another. The case is an indication that perhaps in the
future other courts will also reject the old rule; but the weight of
authority as it now stands still supports the earlier doctrine.

